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THE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE 
NEW ORIGINALISM 
James E. Fleming* 
I.  THE ARC OF ORIGINALISM FROM 1996 TO THE PRESENT 
This Symposium on The New Originalism in Constitutional Law is an 
excellent sequel to the 1996 Fordham Law Review Symposium on Fidelity 
in Constitutional Theory.1  I was privileged to be a co-organizer of that 
conference—together with Abner Greene as well as Martin Flaherty, Robert 
Kaczorowski, and William Treanor—as Dean Michael Martin and 
Associate Dean Benjamin Zipursky have graciously recalled in their 
opening remarks.  I also wrote an article for it.2 
I want to begin by acknowledging how much the landscape of 
constitutional theory has changed since the Fordham Symposium on 
Fidelity.  In 1996, it was common for originalists such as Robert Bork and 
Antonin Scalia to assert a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional 
interpretation, claiming that fidelity requires following the rules laid down 
by, or giving effect to the relatively specific original understanding or 
meaning of, the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution.3  Bork and Scalia 
said that the originalists are the ones who care about fidelity in 
constitutional interpretation, and all those other folks—the “revisionists” 
and “nonoriginalists”—don’t.4 
The Fordham Symposium on Fidelity implicitly challenged this narrow 
originalist claim to a monopoly on fidelity, for it featured several competing 
conceptions of fidelity that were decidedly not conventional originalist 
conceptions:  (1) Ronald Dworkin’s understanding of fidelity as pursuing 
 
*  Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and 
Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School of Law.  
Congratulations to Ben Zipursky, along with Abner Greene and Saul Cornell, for organizing 
such a splendid Symposium.  Thanks to Sot Barber, Abner Greene, and Ben Zipursky for 
helpful discussions concerning my arguments in the Article.  Thanks also to my research 
assistants, Kate Lebeaux and Chris Mercurio.  The Article is part of a book in progress, 
tentatively entitled Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, and accordingly I have drawn 
upon prior work that is a part of that project. 
 1. Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997). 
 2. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1335 (1997). 
 3. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 143 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
854, 862–63 (1989). 
 4. BORK, supra note 3, at 187–240; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37–47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Scalia, supra note 3, at 
852–56, 862–64. 
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integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution;5 (2) Bruce Ackerman’s 
understanding of fidelity as synthesis of constitutional moments;6 (3) 
Lawrence Lessig’s understanding of fidelity as translation across 
generations;7 (4) Jack Rakove’s understanding of fidelity as keeping faith 
with the Founders’ vision;8 and (5) an early formulation of Jack Balkin’s 
conception that ultimately became his method of text and principle with its 
argument for fidelity to abstract original public meaning.9 
Most pointedly, Dworkin sought to turn the tables on the narrow 
originalists like Bork and Scalia:  he argued that commitment to fidelity—
understood as pursuing integrity with the moral reading of the 
Constitution—entails the very approach that they are at pains to insist it 
forbids and prohibits the very approach that they imperiously maintain it 
mandates.  Ackerman, Lessig, and Balkin have taken a different tack, 
attempting to beat narrow originalists at their own game:  they have 
advanced fidelity as synthesis, fidelity as translation, and the method of text 
and principle as broad or abstract or “living” forms of originalism that are 
superior, as conceptions of originalism, to narrow originalism. 
By 1996, originalists had begun to talk about “original understanding” or 
“original meaning” as distinguished from “intention of the Framers.”  And 
some people had begun to talk about “broad” originalism (e.g., Lessig) and 
“faint-hearted” originalism (e.g., Scalia).10  But the “new originalism” as 
we know it today had not yet appeared on the landscape.  Not long after that 
 
 5. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 73–76 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]; RONALD DWORKIN, 
LIFE’S DOMINION:  AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL 
FREEDOM 125–29 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:  Originalism, 
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997). 
 6. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 88–89, 159–62 (1991) 
(developing an understanding of fidelity as questing “multigenerational synthesis” or 
“interpretive synthesis” across the three constitutional regimes or moments of the Founding, 
Reconstruction, and the New Deal); Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519–20 (1997) (advancing his conception of fidelity as pursuing 
intergenerational synthesis). 
 7. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367–68, 
1371–76 (1997) (arguing for an understanding of fidelity as “grounded in a practice of 
translation”); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 
1263–64 (1993) (arguing for a conception of fidelity as translation). 
 8. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 
1605–09 (1997) (discussing “fidelity to history” and its superiority to originalism, which is a 
kind of “fidelity through history”); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–22 (1996) (discussing the 
“perils” of conventional originalism). 
 9. See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1708–09 (1997) (distinguishing between fidelity to the “true 
Constitution or the best interpretation of the Constitution [and] its various historical 
interpretations and manifestations”).  Balkin subsequently reworked and incorporated this 
piece in JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:  POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 103–38 (2011), the companion book to JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–5 
(2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM] (arguing for fidelity to abstract text and 
principle). 
 10. See generally Fleming, supra note 2 (discussing Lessig’s “broad” originalism and 
Scalia’s narrow “faint-hearted” originalism). 
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conference, the new originalism did emerge.  Its earliest formulations 
evidently came from Randy Barnett in An Originalism for Nonoriginalists11 
and Keith Whittington shortly thereafter in The New Originalism.12 
How has originalism changed since 1996?  I shall distinguish several 
points or phases in the “arc of originalism” from the old to the new.13  
These points are analytical, and only roughly chronological.  The first phase 
I have called (1) the “Balkanization of originalism” (together with (2) the 
“Balkinization of originalism”).  That is what happens (1) when originalism 
splits into warring camps and (2) when even Jack Balkin, hitherto a 
pragmatic living constitutionalist, becomes an originalist.14  During this 
phase, which continues today, we see that originalism is a moving target, a 
work in progress, or a family of theories rather than one coherent, unified 
constitutional theory. 
The second phase is the development of a highly programmatic new 
originalism (or new originalisms).  During this phase, which is well 
represented at this conference by Randy Barnett, Keith Whittington, and 
Lawrence Solum, sophisticated constitutional theorists have developed 
disciplined, programmatic conceptions of constitutional interpretation and 
construction.  These new originalists have emphasized two developments:  
(1) the movement from a focus on “intention of the Framers” to “original 
public meaning” and (2) the articulation of and emphasis on the distinction 
between interpretation and construction. 
Third, and roughly parallel to the movement from the first phase to the 
second, is the movement from:  (1) a dogmatic, axiomatic view assuming 
that originalism simply has to be the best, or indeed the only, conception of 
constitutional interpretation to (2) a view recognizing that originalists have 
to make normative arguments in support of their conceptions.  I have 
criticized the former view as stemming from what I have called “the 
originalist premise.”15  The originalist premise is the assumption that 
originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of 
fidelity in constitutional interpretation.  Put more strongly, it is the 
assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the best, or indeed 
the only, conception of constitutional interpretation.  Why so? Because 
originalism, rightly conceived, just has to be.  By definition.  In the nature 
of things—in the nature of the Constitution, in the nature of law, in the 
nature of interpretation, in the nature of fidelity in constitutional 
interpretation!  Axiomatically. 
 
 11. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
 12. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).  
Whittington presented drafts of this paper as early as 2002. 
 13. The title of the panel in the Fordham Symposium on The New Originalism in 
Constitutional Law for which I prepared this Article was “The Arc of Originalism.” 
 14. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10 
(2007); James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669 
[hereinafter Fleming, Balkinization]. 
 15. James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now?  I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1785, 1794–97 (2013); Fleming, supra note 2, at 1344. 
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Illustrating the latter view, Solum stresses normative arguments for 
originalism from rule of law/determinacy, popular sovereignty/democracy, 
and ruliness, while Whittington emphasizes an argument from fidelity.16  I 
shall take up their arguments in Part IV.  In making these normative 
arguments, the new originalists have made spectacular concessions to 
critics of originalism like the moral readers.  (By “moral reading,” I refer to 
conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political 
principles, not codifying concrete historical rules or practices.)  Indeed, they 
have unwittingly shown that they are engaged in making normative 
judgments that the moral readers have argued were necessary and that the 
old originalists have contended were illegitimate and forbidden (in Bork’s 
formulations, “subver[sive]” and “here[tical]”).17 
A fourth and final point in the arc of originalism, also parallel to these 
other movements, is a shift from an exclusionary outlook to an inclusionary 
outlook, to be explained in Part II.  As my title suggests, I am going to bring 
out the inclusiveness of the new originalism and ponder its implications.18 
This Article is part of a larger work, a book in progress tentatively 
entitled Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution.19  To set the stage for my 
arguments about the inclusiveness of the new originalism, I shall draw upon 
several pieces in the story thus far.  My main points are two.  First, the 
inclusiveness of the new originalism shows that it will require the very 
judgments that proponents of the moral reading have argued are necessary 
in constitutional interpretation and construction.  Indeed, this inclusiveness 
points toward the possibility of reconciliation between certain forms of the 
new originalism and the moral reading.  But second, I shall sketch a 
cautionary tale about the movement within originalism from “intention of 
the Framers” to “original public meaning.”  For example, in Justice Scalia’s 
hands, resort to original public meaning over and against the purposes of 
constitutional amendment as expressed by the Framers and ratifiers in their 
language and debates may blunt the very possibility of constitutional 
transformation through amendment. 
 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. BORK, supra note 3, at 136, 352. 
 18. I mean to intimate an analogy between inclusive new originalism and the idea within 
jurisprudence of “inclusive legal positivism.”  Put roughly, “inclusive legal positivism” 
responds to criticisms of positivism by moral readers like Dworkin by incorporating the 
moral principles and judgments Dworkin says are necessary—and which exclusive legal 
positivism excludes—within positivism itself.  Likewise, inclusive new originalism responds 
to criticisms of originalism by moral readers like Dworkin by incorporating the moral 
principles and judgments Dworkin says are necessary—and which exclusive originalism 
excludes—within the new originalism itself. 
 19. My article for the Fordham Symposium on Fidelity bearing the same title, Fleming, 
supra note 2, was my first article in what has become the book project. 
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II.  ARE WE ALL ORIGINALISTS NOW? 
In recent years, some have asked:  “Are we all originalists now?”  My 
response to the question is:  “I hope not!”20  By contrast, Solum replies:  
“We are all originalists now.”21  The answer to the question depends, as he 
recognizes, on “what one means by originalism”22 and whether we define it 
exclusively or inclusively. 
In defining originalism, Solum distills an elegant framework with four 
basic ideas.  It is worth quoting in full: 
1. The fixation thesis:  The linguistic meaning of the constitutional text 
was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified. 
2. The public meaning thesis:  Constitutional meaning is fixed by the 
understanding of the words and phrases and the grammar and syntax that 
characterized the linguistic practices of the public and not by the 
intentions of the framers. 
3. The textual constraint thesis:  The original meaning of the text of the 
Constitution has legal force:  the text is law and not a mere symbol. 
4. The interpretation-construction distinction:  Constitutional practice 
includes two distinct activities:  (1) constitutional interpretation, which 
discerns the linguistic meaning of the text, and (2) constitutional 
construction, which determines the legal effect of the text.23 
Solum aspires to understand originalism (and, for that matter, living 
constitutionalism) “in their best light—in their most sophisticated and 
defensible versions.”24 
If we define originalism inclusively enough, we might say that we 
evidently are all originalists now.  Indeed, we might just define originalism 
so broadly that even I would no longer hope that we are not all originalists 
now!  Applying Solum’s framework, we would conclude that Balkin, with 
his self-described living originalist method of text and principle, definitely 
is an originalist.25  Dworkin, with his moral reading of the Constitution, 
surely also is.26  Sotirios A. Barber and I, with our philosophic approach to 
constitutional interpretation (and my own “Constitution-perfecting theory”), 
are as well.27  So, too, are reasonable, bounded, and grounded versions of 
 
 20. Fleming, supra note 15.  In this section, I draw upon my arguments in the cited 
article. 
 21. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A 
DEBATE 3 (2011).  All citations to the foregoing source refer only to Lawrence Solum’s 
contributions to the book.  In this section and the next, I draw from my review of the book, 
James E. Fleming, The New Originalist Manifesto, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 539 (2013) (book 
review). 
 22. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 61 (emphasis omitted). 
 23. Id. at 4. 
 24. Id. at 5. 
 25. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 9. 
 26. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 5. 
 27. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  THE 
BASIC QUESTIONS (2007); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:  THE 
CASE OF AUTONOMY 16, 210–11 (2006). 
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living constitutionalism.  All of these theories evidently can accept the four 
theses quoted above.  Under Solum’s formulation, originalism clearly is a 
big tent—charitable, magnanimous, and inclusionary—rather than the 
dogmatic, scolding, and exclusionary outlook that we see in originalist 
works like Bork’s The Tempting of America and Scalia’s A Matter of 
Interpretation.28 
But if we define originalism so inclusively—and we are all now in this 
big tent—it may not be very useful to say that we are all originalists now.  
We may obscure our differences more than we elucidate common ground.  
We would persist in most of our theoretical disagreements—it is just that 
we would say that the disagreements are among varieties of so-called 
originalism. And the debates concerning interpretation and construction, 
thus recast or translated, would go on much as before. 
Clearly, affirmative answers to the question, “are we all originalists 
now?” stem from inclusive conceptions of what comes within originalism 
and, in particular, the new originalism or new originalisms.  For we most 
definitely are not all old originalists now!  In bringing out the inclusiveness 
of the new originalism, I shall focus on Solum’s emphasis on the distinction 
between interpretation and construction, in particular, his acknowledgment 
of the large role that construction (which on his account is not originalist) 
plays in our constitutional practice. 
III.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERPRETATION 
AND CONSTRUCTION 
Let’s be clear about what Solum claims regarding the significance of the 
distinction between interpretation and construction.  In explaining this 
distinction, he invokes H.L.A. Hart’s well-known formulation concerning 
the core and penumbra. He presents the core as a zone for interpretation and 
the penumbra as a zone for construction.29  He contends that hard cases, by 
definition, are underdetermined by interpretation of original public meaning 
and so require construction.30 
Furthermore, Solum says that originalism is a theory of interpretation, 
not a theory of construction.  In developing the interpretation-construction 
distinction, Solum plainly states, “Originalism itself does not have a theory 
of constitutional construction.”31  He also states, “Whereof originalism 
cannot speak, thereof it must be silent.”32  Even though construction in hard 
cases lies beyond interpretation (and thus beyond originalism), he claims 
that new originalists insist that original public meaning should constrain 
construction.33 
 
 28. BORK, supra note 3; SCALIA, supra note 4. 
 29. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 121–32 (1961)). 
 30. Id. at 22–23. 
 31. Id. at 60. 
 32. Id. at 26. 
 33. Id. 
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I shall make two general observations that demonstrate how inclusive 
Solum’s new originalism is.  First, Solum concedes that much that is 
important in constitutional law goes on in the construction zone in deciding 
hard cases and developing constitutional doctrine.  We might doubt how 
many important constitutional questions are resolved through interpretation 
of original public meaning.  I suspect that Solum would find greater 
agreement with his analysis of interpretation and construction among living 
constitutionalists and moral readers than among most conventional 
originalists.  For living constitutionalists and moral readers would agree that 
hard cases lie in the construction zone and that interpretation of original 
public meaning does not determine the outcomes in these disputes.  But old 
originalists and many other contemporary originalists would reject these 
claims as capitulations.  Some, like the old originalists, would insist that 
interpretation is determinative both in deciding hard cases and developing 
constitutional doctrine.34  Others would deny the necessity or the legitimacy 
of construction.  And some who accept the legitimacy of construction 
would go along with Whittington in adopting what Solum calls the model 
of construction as politics:  they would say that interpretation is for courts 
and construction is for legislatures and executives.35 
Second, what Solum says about how construction should proceed—how 
he proposes to build out doctrine and decide hard cases in the construction 
zone—is compatible with a moral reading.  In defending this view, I shall 
focus on two things he says about originalism in relation to construction.  
One, Solum states that “originalists can and should agree that constitutional 
construction (as currently practiced) involves a plurality of methods—
purposes, structure, precedent, and all the rest.”36  He rejects the common 
living constitutionalist argument that the very existence of “multiple 
modalities” shows the impossibility of originalism.  He contends instead 
that “these methods are properly brought to bear on the task of 
constitutional construction.”37  Thus, he practically makes peace with living 
constitutionalism concerning the multiple modalities of argument in the 
construction zone.  Whittington recently has taken a similar approach in 
recognizing what he calls “pluralism within originalism” or how originalist 
arguments exist in an environment of “pluralism in constitutional 
interpretation”38 (or, Solum would insist, construction). 
Two, Solum mentions three available models of construction as eligible 
within the new originalism: 
 
 34. Id. at 20–22. 
 35. Id. at 69–70. 
 36. Id. at 60. 
 37. Id. at 59–60 (referring to the well-known view concerning multiple modalities as 
developed in PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982)). 
 38. See Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70, 76 (Grant Huscroft & 
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
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1. Construction as politics (associated with Whittington):  “when judges 
leave the realm of constitutional interpretation and enter the construction 
zone, they defer to the decisions made by political processes.” 
2. Construction as principle (associated with Balkin):  “[i]n the 
construction zone, judges should aim to create constitutional doctrines 
that comport with political ideals for which the general, abstract, and 
vague provisions of the Constitution aim.” 
3. Construction by original methods (inspired by the work of John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport but not their own view):  “when 
modern courts engage in constitutional construction, they should employ” 
the original methods in use when the Constitution was adopted.39 
Solum does not exactly say which model of construction is the most 
promising for the new originalism that he himself proposes.  But there are 
significant differences between Whittington’s model of construction as 
politics and Solum’s approach to construction.  For Whittington, at least in 
his initial formulation, interpretation is for judges and construction is for 
legislatures and executives.40  For Solum, by contrast, construction is also 
for judges in developing constitutional doctrine where interpretation is 
underdeterminative.41  Furthermore, it does not appear that Solum himself 
would emphasize construction by original methods.  Finally, there is good 
reason to believe that Solum thinks that Balkin’s model of construction as 
principle is the most promising approach for the new originalism that he 
himself advocates.  What is more, Balkin’s is the most promising model for 
a reconciliation of originalism and living constitutionalism; indeed, Balkin 
calls his new originalism “living originalism.”42 
There is also considerable hope for reconciliation between new 
originalism and moral readings regarding construction.  First, moral readers 
like Barber and I deploy a fusion of approaches in what Solum calls “the 
construction zone.”  “Within such a fusion, we . . . understand text, 
consensus, intentions, structures, and doctrines not as alternatives to but as 
sites of philosophic reflection and choice about the best understanding of 
our constitutional commitments.”43  Second, moral readers should embrace 
Balkin’s model of construction as the method of text and principle.  In fact, 
I have argued that Balkin’s theory is a moral reading of the Constitution.44  
For Balkin conceives the Constitution as embodying not only rules but also 
general standards and abstract principles.  He recognizes that in interpreting 
these general standards and abstract principles, we have to make moral and 
political judgments concerning the best understanding of our commitments; 
history alone does not make those judgments for us in rule-like fashion.45  
Moreover, there are unmistakable affinities between Balkin’s commitment 
 
 39. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 69–70. 
 40. See infra Part IV. 
 41. See infra Part IV. 
 42. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 9. 
 43. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 27, at 190. 
 44. Fleming, Balkinization, supra note 14, at 675–79. 
 45. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 9, at 23–34. 
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to interpret and construct the Constitution so as to redeem our faith in its 
promises and aspirations, and a moral reading’s commitment to interpret 
and construct the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.46 
Thus, if Solum’s new originalism embraces Balkin’s method of text and 
principle—as an approach to interpretation and construction—it has much 
in common with a moral reading. 
IV.  THE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NEW ORIGINALISM 
Unlike many originalists, who practically assume that originalism—by 
definition or axiomatically—is the only legitimate approach to 
constitutional interpretation,47 Solum acknowledges the need to make 
normative arguments for originalism.  He stresses the arguments that 
originalism is more compatible with the rule of law and popular sovereignty 
and is more ruly than competing theories.48  But Solum’s generous and 
inclusive formulation of the new originalism undercuts all of these 
arguments concerning the supposed virtues of originalism over the moral 
reading. 
In making such normative arguments for originalism, the new originalists 
trade on certain features of familiar pictures of originalism without 
acknowledging that they have redrawn those pictures so as to blur or 
obliterate those features—without acknowledging the concessions that they 
have made to living constitutionalists’ and moral readers’ criticisms.  Once 
we bring the concessions to light—as aspects of the inclusiveness of the 
new originalism—we see that the new originalists forfeit their claims to 
these supposed virtues of originalism over the moral reading.  And, once 
the new originalists make these arguments—with their concessions to moral 
readers—we see that they are no longer simply engaged in a quest for the 
original public meaning of the Constitution while avoiding normative 
judgments of the sort called for by the moral reading.  Instead, we see that 
they implicitly have conceded the need to make the very normative 
judgments that moral readers have insisted upon and that the old originalists 
have been at pains to avoid. 
First, consider the rule-of-law/determinacy argument.  The general claim 
is that originalism promises more determinacy in constitutional 
interpretation than does the moral reading and, as such, is more consistent 
with the rule of law.  After all, originalism, even the new originalism, seeks 
to discover and enforce the original public meaning of the Constitution.  By 
contrast, the moral reading requires complex and controversial normative 
judgments about the best understanding of abstract constitutional 
commitments. 
 
 46. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986). 
 47. For criticism of originalists who evidently take it as axiomatically given, see 
BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 27, at 104–07; Fleming, supra note 15, at 1794–96; 
Fleming, supra note 2, at 1344. 
 48. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 36–44. 
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Yet Solum’s concessions that interpretation underdetermines outcomes, 
and that the development of doctrine occurs in the construction zone, 
undermines his rule of law argument that only originalism “guarantees a 
stable core of fixed constitutional meaning.”49  Indeed, on his account, the 
development of doctrine takes place in the construction zone, and 
originalism does not provide a theory of construction.  Moreover, Solum 
concedes that some constitutional commitments are relatively abstract 
principles and standards, for example, equal protection, liberty, cruel and 
unusual punishment, freedom of speech, and the like.  Interpretation (much 
less construction) of these abstract principles and standards, however, will 
not be a matter of doing historical research to unearth determinate, concrete 
original public meanings (much less concrete original expected applications 
of the Framers and ratifiers).  It will not be bounded and determinate in the 
way that the argument from rule of law/determinacy presupposes.  Nor, 
indeed, will construction be bounded in this way.  Rather, interpretation and 
construction of relatively abstract principles and standards are going to 
require normative judgments about the best understanding of those 
principles and standards.  These are the very judgments which moral 
readers have insisted are central to constitutional interpretation and 
construction and which old originalists have sought in vain to banish. 
Second, consider the argument from popular sovereignty/democracy.  
The general claim is that originalism is more democratic than the moral 
reading because originalism invalidates actions embodying current majority 
will (as enacted in the ordinary law of legislation) in the name of preserving 
the will of We the People (as embodied in the higher law of the 
Constitution) against encroachment.  Whereas (so the originalists say) the 
moral reading does so in the name of the moral judgments of unelected 
justices of the Supreme Court.  As such, the argument goes, originalism is 
ultimately more democratic.  Indeed, it is consistent with and reinforces 
popular sovereignty. 
Yet Solum’s ideas about how we develop doctrine in the construction 
zone undermines his popular sovereignty argument for originalism.  For it 
turns out that We the People when ratifying the Constitution in 1791, or 
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, did not adopt determinative 
answers to our questions.  And so, in constructing doctrine, the new 
originalists are not simply following the rules laid down by We the People.  
Thus, even on Solum’s account, the decisions made by the popular 
sovereign in the past are underdeterminative; to that degree, the argument 
for originalism from popular sovereignty is attenuated.  The method of 
construction as principle is not going to involve resolution of hard cases 
through historical research concerning relatively concrete and determinate 
original public meaning.  It is going to require making normative judgments 
about the best understanding of our constitutional commitments to 
relatively abstract principles and standards.  Again, these are the very 
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judgments that moral readers have insisted are necessary and that old 
originalists have asserted were illegitimate if not subversive and heretical. 
Third, consider the ruliness argument for originalism.  The ruliness claim 
is that originalism is more rule-like and thus more ruly than living 
constitutionalism and moral readings.  For originalism claims, again, that 
constitutional interpretation is a matter of determining the historical original 
public meaning of relatively concrete commitments.  This is as it should be 
under an understanding of the rule of law as a law of rules.50  Constitutional 
interpretation is not—the ruliness argument claims—a matter of making 
controversial normative judgments about the best understanding of abstract 
commitments.  It is not a matter of making all-things-considered “reasoned 
judgments” about what our commitments and traditions, understood as 
“living thing[s],” have come to when understood in their best light.51  Nor is 
constitutional interpretation a matter of making complex normative and 
pragmatic judgments after deploying “multiple modalities” of constitutional 
argument.52  These types of argument and judgment—the heart of 
interpretation and construction for living constitutionalists and moral 
readers—have been anathema to originalists like Scalia and Bork because 
they seem to be unruly and to require complex normative or pragmatic 
judgments. 
Yet, new originalists like Solum, in response to living constitutionalist 
arguments that “multiple modalities” of argument in our constitutional 
practice refute originalism, now say that originalists can accept that 
construction embraces these multiple modalities of argument.53  Likewise, 
new originalists like Whittington now say that (evidently hitherto monistic) 
originalists can recognize and accept what he calls “pluralism within 
originalism” or how originalist arguments exist in an environment of 
“pluralism in constitutional interpretation”54 (or, Solum would insist, 
construction). 
But in making these concessions the new originalists forfeit the ruliness 
argument for originalism over the moral reading.  Not just because they let 
in the “multiple modalities” in the first place; but also because they cannot 
plausibly claim that judges and scholars who work through and assess the 
multiple modalities of argument are seeking to discover and enforce the 
original public meaning of the Constitution.  Instead, they quite plainly are 
making normative or pragmatic judgments about the best understanding of 
our constitutional commitments and practice.  Again, these are the very 
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judgments that the moral readers have insisted were necessary, and that the 
old originalists have disparaged as illegitimate. 
Fourth and finally, consider the argument for originalism from fidelity.  
In The New Originalism, Whittington argues, “The primary virtue claimed 
by the new originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of judicial 
restraint or democratic majoritarianism.”55  He contends that the new 
originalism “does not require judges to get out of the way of legislatures.  It 
requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also 
nothing less.”56  Whittington’s argument from fidelity brings us back to the 
topic of the 1996 Fordham Symposium. 
As I observed above, many originalists have claimed a monopoly on 
concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation, yet many leading 
constitutional scholars in that Symposium advanced conceptions of fidelity 
that are not conventional originalist conceptions.  In my paper for the 
Symposium, I argued that the aspiration to fidelity 
raises two fundamental questions:  Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity? 
The short answer to the first—fidelity to the Constitution—poses a further 
question:  What is the Constitution?  For example, does the Fourteenth 
Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact relatively concrete 
historical rules? . . . The short answer to the second—being faithful to the 
Constitution in interpreting it—leads to another question:  How should the 
Constitution be interpreted?  Does faithfulness to the Fourteenth 
Amendment require recourse to political theory to elaborate general moral 
concepts or prohibit it and instead require historical research to discover 
relatively specific original understanding?  And does the quest for fidelity 
in interpreting the Constitution exhort us to make it the best it can be or 
forbid us to do so in favor of enforcing an imperfect Constitution?57 
The old originalists answered the first question—Fidelity to what?—by 
saying, why of course fidelity to the intention of the Framers or the concrete 
original expected applications of the Framers and ratifiers.  Yet the new 
originalists, somewhat like the moral readers, answer it by saying, fidelity 
to the original public meaning, which includes that of some relatively 
abstract principles and standards.  The old originalists answered the second 
question—What is fidelity?—with their authoritarian understanding that 
fidelity commands us to follow the authority of the past:  following our 
historical practices and the concrete original expected applications of the 
Framers and ratifiers.  The moral readers, by contrast, answer it with their 
understanding that fidelity exhorts us to honor our abstract aspirational 
principles (or to redeem the promise of our abstract commitments).  Fidelity 
is living up to and realizing the aspirations embodied in our experiment in 
self-governance under a scheme of principles. 
The new originalists, with their new arguments and new conceptions, 
cannot simply adhere to the old originalist conception of fidelity.  In other 
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work, I have argued—and in my book in progress I shall further argue—
that the moral reading offers a better understanding of fidelity than does any 
variety of originalism, old or new.58  I shall not repeat those arguments 
here.  The point that is relevant here is that once the new originalists make 
the reasonable and inclusive concessions that they have made—that 
constitutional adjudication:  (1) includes interpretation and construction of 
relatively abstract principles and standards, not merely interpretation of 
determinate, concrete rules or terms of art; (2) involves interpretation and 
construction through multiple modalities of argument, not simply 
interpretation through historical research concerning concrete original 
expected applications; and (3) requires construction that is not originalist 
and that involves making normative judgments about how to redeem the 
Constitution’s abstract commitments—they have forfeited their arguments 
that originalism is superior on the ground of fidelity to the moral reading.  
For they have implicitly accepted the moral reading’s conception of fidelity 
as requiring complex normative judgments in order to realize our 
constitutional commitments and aspirations, or to interpret and construct the 
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.  And they have implicitly 
rejected the old originalist conception of fidelity as simply following the 
commands of the Framers and ratifiers, or following the authority of the 
past. 
To recapitulate:  the inclusiveness of the new originalism—in particular, 
the arguments regarding construction—undermines the new originalists’ 
normative arguments for originalism over the moral reading, indeed forfeits 
the new originalism’s supposed comparative virtues.  What is the upshot of 
my argument?  Should the new originalists like Solum not have made these 
reasonable, inclusive concessions to the moral reading that conventional 
originalists have resisted?  Should they have remained doggedly 
exclusionary, dogmatically insisting on their superior claim to these virtues 
and rejecting construction as illegitimate? 
Most certainly not.  My point is not that the new originalists have gone 
wrong in being inclusive.  Quite the opposite.  It is rather that the new 
originalists, having made these concessions, should now also acknowledge 
that they are engaged in a moral reading of the Constitution.  To Solum’s 
question, “Are we all originalists now?” I not only answer “I hope not,” but 
also aim to show the extent to which we are all moral readers now.59  I shall 
pursue these matters further in my book.  There I shall urge the new 
originalists to come within the big tent of the moral reading. 
So far, I have focused on the first of Solum’s claims about what is 
distinctive about the new originalism:  the significance of the distinction 
between interpretation and construction.  Now, I shall turn to the second of 
his claims:  the significance of the movement from “intention of the 
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Framers” to “original public meaning.”  To this point, I have characterized 
this development optimistically, pointing out that to the extent the new 
originalists acknowledge that we might conceive original public meaning 
abstractly, the new originalism might be inclusive and bear affinities to the 
moral reading.  In the final section of this Article, I shall acknowledge that 
this move to original public meaning is not necessarily more hospitable to 
the moral reading.  We can see this clearly in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of Justice Scalia. 
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVEMENT FROM INTENTION OF THE 
FRAMERS TO ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING 
In some instances, I believe that the move within originalism from 
intention of the Framers to original public meaning is largely a public 
relations move—one that seems to acknowledge the flaws in the old 
originalism, yet to leave the actual practice of originalism unaffected.  That 
is, originalists officially state that their quest is for the original public 
meaning.  But they persist in dredging up what they see as concrete original 
expected applications of the Framers and ratifiers or they rewrite evidently 
abstract commitments like “privileges or immunities” or “freedom of 
speech” into determinate, lawyerly terms of art (commitments concerning 
which, ironically, there is no original public meaning, only technical 
lawyerly meanings beyond the ken of the public).  Balkin has demonstrated 
this point effectively.60 
In other instances, however, the move to original public meaning does 
affect the practice of originalism.  For example, in Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudence, it moves originalism in a conservative direction.  Here I 
mean “conservative” not simply in a substantive political sense of 
supporting the outcomes conservatives favor, but also in a Burkean sense of 
conceiving original public meaning as being the deposit of historical 
practices rather than abstract normative commitments that might be critical 
of, or at any rate different from, those practices.  We see this clearly in 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) 
case, United States v. Virginia,61 and his opinion of the Court in the right to 
bear arms case, District of Columbia v. Heller.62 
On Justice Scalia’s view, the original public meaning of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
the ordinary moral understandings of citizens in 1868 concerning their 
normative commitments to abstract and contested principles like equality 
and liberty.  Rather, it is the deposit of historical practices embodied in the 
statute books and common law as of 1868.  Scalia famously articulates this 
conception in his dissent in Virginia (in the context of equal protection) and 
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in his plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.63 (in the setting of due 
process). 
According to Scalia, the point of constitutional commitments is to 
embody historical practices so conceived.  And so, for example, the original 
public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is not that of an abstract, 
normative principle that condemns class legislation or the maintenance of a 
caste system that reduces or maintains certain classes of people in the status 
of an inferior caste beneath full citizenship—whether on the basis of race, 
sex, or sexual orientation.  Instead, for Scalia, the Equal Protection Clause 
embodies a deposit of historical practices:  if single-sex educational 
institutions like VMI were not viewed as an unconstitutional practice in 
1868, and there has been a historical practice of maintaining such single-sex 
educational institutions ever since, then the operation of VMI as a single-
sex military college simply does not violate the Constitution. 
To elaborate, in dissent in Virginia, Scalia objects that “[the Court] 
counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of 
men’s military colleges supported by both States and the Federal 
Government.”64  Let’s contrast Scalia’s view with Justice Ginsberg’s view 
in the opinion of the Court concerning history and tradition in interpreting 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Let’s distinguish between two competing 
conceptions of tradition:  historical practices (equal protection includes 
whatever was protected specifically in the statute books or recognized 
concretely in the common law when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted in 1868) versus aspirational principles (equal protection embodies 
principles to which we as a people aspire, and for which we as a people 
stand, whether or not we have always or yet realized them in our historical 
practices, statute books, or common law).65  Which conception does Scalia 
embrace?  Clearly the former, historical practices.  Which conception does 
Ginsburg embrace?  Clearly the latter, aspirational principles that are 
critical of our longstanding historical practices.  Furthermore, let’s contrast 
Ginsburg’s and Scalia’s attitudes toward the longstanding historical practice 
of excluding women from VMI.  Ginsburg views this as longstanding sex 
discrimination in violation of the Constitution, which aspires to “full 
citizenship stature” for women as well as men.66  By contrast, Scalia writes 
that “longstanding national traditions [are] the primary determinant of what 
the Constitution means.”67  Indeed, he argues that the Court’s interpretation 
of the Equal Protection Clause “cannot supersede—and indeed ought to be 
crafted so as to reflect—those constant and unbroken national traditions 
that embody the people’s understanding” of the Equal Protection Clause.68  
In short, the fact that we have a longstanding historical practice of 
excluding women from VMI is practically conclusive evidence that the 
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exclusion of women from VMI does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
For moral readers such as Justice Brennan, Justice Ginsburg, or Justice 
Stevens, the point of adopting and amending the Constitution is not to 
embody longstanding historical practices, but to transform them in pursuit 
of our constitutional aspirations to normative principles like equality and 
liberty.  Brennan wrote,  “Interpretation must account for the transformative 
purpose of the text.  Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a 
preexisting society but to make a new one, to put in place new principles 
that the prior political community had not sufficiently recognized.”  He 
continued,  “Thus, for example, when we interpret the Civil War 
amendments . . . we must remember that those who put them in place had 
no desire to enshrine the status quo. Their goal was to make over their 
world.”69  That is Brennan’s conception of the abstract, aspirational original 
public meaning of the Civil War Amendments, including the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  For Brennan, Ginsburg, and Stevens, the Fourteenth 
Amendment commits us to equal protection on our best understanding, not 
equality as it was reflected in the common law and statute books in 1868, 
with all manner of racist, sexist, and heterosexist expectations and 
presuppositions.70  It also commits us to liberty on our best understanding, 
not liberty as it was manifested in the common law and statute books as of 
1868.71  As they see it, originalists seeking to enforce Scalia-like 
conceptions of original public meaning eviscerate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s transformative purposes. 
To take another example, in Heller, Scalia presupposes—with his version 
of original public meaning originalism—that the point of adopting the 
Second Amendment was to codify a preexisting common law individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense as recorded in Blackstone.72  He 
presupposes this irrespective of (and in the face of) the language of the 
Second Amendment—“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed”73—which suggests that its purpose instead is to preserve 
well-regulated state militias.  And he presupposes this irrespective of the 
 
 69. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:  Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986). 
 70. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Civil War Amendments used ‘language [that] authorized transformative 
new federal statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and inequality.’” (quoting AKHIL 
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 361, 363, 399 (2005))); Reva B. 
Siegel, Equality’s Frontiers:  How Congress’s Section 5 Power Can Secure Transformative 
Equality (As Justice Ginsburg Illustrates in Coleman), 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2013). 
 71. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 743 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he source of [the] right to refuse treatment was not just a common-law rule.  
Rather, this right is an aspect of a far broader and more basic concept of freedom that is even 
older than the common law.  This freedom embraces not merely a person’s right to refuse a 
particular kind of unwanted treatment, but also her interest in dignity, and in determining the 
character of the memories that will survive long after her death.”). 
 72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–97 (2008). 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
2013] THE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE NEW ORIGINALISM 449 
arguments in the debates concerning the reasons for adopting the 
Amendment, which suggest that its purpose was to protect state militias 
from being abolished by the federal government.74  Scalia construes the 
purpose of the Amendment in light of his prior jurisprudential 
presupposition that constitutional commitments are the deposit of historical 
practices.  The “meaning of the operative clause” of the Second 
Amendment75—because of his prior jurisprudential presuppositions about 
the point of adopting a constitutional amendment protecting rights—just 
has to be to codify the common law right to bear arms for self-defense. 
Justice Stevens, who takes a purposive approach to constitutional 
interpretation in general, and to the Second Amendment in particular, 
begins with the preamble to the Amendment—“A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State”—and construes the right to 
bear arms in light of that stated purpose.76  He observes that the language of 
the Amendment says nothing about a common law individual right to bear 
arms for self-defense.  He further observes that the arguments in the debates 
confirm that the purpose in adopting the Amendment was to protect against 
federal abolition of state militias.  Furthermore, just as Stevens has rejected 
Scalia’s idea that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause is to embody common law practices regarding liberty,77 so too he 
rejects the idea that the purpose of the Second Amendment is to codify 
common law practices concerning an individual right to bear arms for self-
defense.  Instead, for Stevens, we have to ask what purpose is expressed in 
the actual language of the Second Amendment, and whether the debates by 
the Framers and ratifiers concerning the reasons for adopting the 
Amendment confirm that stated purpose. 
In common understanding, originalist interpretation is thought to involve 
discovering and following the intent of the Framers.  Yet Scalia, an avowed 
originalist, writes: 
 Justice Stevens relies on the drafting history of the Second 
Amendment—the various proposals in the state conventions and the 
debates in Congress.  It is dubious to rely on such history to interpret a 
text that was widely understood to codify a pre-existing right, rather than 
to fashion a new one.78 
What is going on here?  Many have distinguished between “old 
originalism,” which is concerned to discover and follow the intent of the 
Framers, and “new originalism,” which is concerned to discover and follow 
the original public meaning of the words of the document (irrespective of 
what the Framers might have intended).  Here, Scalia is claiming to be an 
original public meaning originalist, and he is claiming that the original 
public meaning of the Second Amendment was to codify a preexisting 
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common law right, which he claims was an individual right to bear arms for 
self-defense. 
Furthermore, in our own time, disagreement about the meaning of our 
basic constitutional commitments, including constitutional rights protected 
by the Second Amendment, is deep and pervasive.  Yet Justice Scalia 
writes, “Justice Stevens’ view . . . relies on the proposition, unsupported by 
any evidence, that different people of the Founding period had vastly 
different conceptions of the right to keep and bear arms.  That simply does 
not comport with our longstanding view that the Bill of Rights codified 
venerable, widely understood liberties.”79  Is this a sound presupposition 
about constitutional commitments?  If one looks at all of the historical 
evidence presented in the three opinions in Heller, isn’t it very much open 
to question whether the Second Amendment was “widely understood” to 
protect the liberties that Scalia insists upon?  Again, Scalia takes this view 
because of his prior jurisprudential presupposition that this just has to be 
the nature of constitutional commitments, irrespective of the language of 
the Constitution and of the evidence of disagreement concerning its 
meaning.  That is why Scalia rejects, as “dubious,” any arguments from the 
debates concerning the reasons for adoption of the Second Amendment—
the arguments that Stevens sees as central to understanding the purpose of 
the Amendment. 
To suggest just how radically conservative Scalia’s presuppositions about 
original public meaning are, I shall formulate two hypotheticals involving 
constitutional amendments protecting the right to bear arms, with two sets 
of evidence concerning the reasons for adopting the amendment.  Each 
hypothetical amendment contains the same text:  “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  Is this some kind of joke?  
Don’t I know that the Second Amendment already consists of this very 
language?  I do.  As will soon become clear, that’s part of the point of the 
exercise. 
(1) The first hypothetical goes like this.  It is 1791.  James Madison 
proposes the foregoing language of the amendment.  He says: 
 I know that there is a common law individual right to bear arms for 
self-defense as recorded in Blackstone.  Forget that common law right.  
And forget Blackstone.  We’ll leave it to the common law to protect that 
right.  We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are making and 
amending.80  We are making over the world81—embarking upon an 
experiment in constitutional self-government by reflection and choice82—
not codifying common law rights or enshrining the deposit of historical 
practices.  What we are concerned about here is the states’ right to 
maintain a well regulated militia, and we are concerned that without this 
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amendment the federal government might abolish state militias.  And so, 
to make it as clear as language possibly can, we are going to insert a 
preamble at the beginning of the amendment:  “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State.”  This language will make 
it clear beyond doubt that we are not here talking about any common law 
individual right to bear arms for self-defense.  No one will ever be able to 
gainsay that the amendment is instead concerned with protecting the 
states’ right to maintain a well regulated militia. 
In this hypothetical, Madison drafts the amendment and is the only one who 
speaks about its purpose and meaning at the convention.  Immediately after 
his speech, which receives a standing ovation, the delegates unanimously 
propose the amendment.  It is subsequently ratified. 
I daresay that, even under this hypothetical, Scalia would interpret the 
original public meaning of the amendment as being to codify the common 
law individual right to bear arms for self-defense.  He would advance this 
interpretation, not because of any reason given in support of this 
interpretation at the time of the framing and adoption of the amendment.  
He would advance it instead because of his prior jurisprudential 
presupposition that constitutional rights, as such, must codify known, 
preexisting rights, not fashion new ones.  Again, with this jurisprudential 
preconception, Scalia blunts the transformative purpose of constitution 
making and amendment, and renders vain any attempt to “make over the 
world” or “fashion new rights” that are not longstanding common law 
rights. 
(2) Here is the second hypothetical.  It is 2018.  In the ten years since the 
Supreme Court decided Heller, Heller itself—together with a series of 
school massacres and assassinations of presidents and members of Congress 
who fought for gun control measures—provokes a backlash leading to a 
constitutional amendment.  The supporters of gun control in the House and 
Senate—led by the biggest critics of Heller’s reading of the Second 
Amendment as protecting an individual right to bear arms for self-defense 
rather than the states’ right to maintain a well regulated militia—as a rebuke 
to the Court’s interpretation in Heller, reaffirm the very language of that 
Amendment through the constitutional amendment process.  During the 
process of amendment, they hold elaborate and extensive debates 
concerning the reasons for adopting the amendment and reaffirming the 
language of the Second Amendment, emphasizing the aim to repeal 
Heller’s interpretation of that very language.  They engage in extensive 
criticism of Scalia’s opinion in Heller and extensive praise of Stevens’s and 
Breyer’s dissenting opinions.  They also carry out extensive discussion to 
establish beyond doubt that the purpose of the preamble is to make it as 
clear as words can make it that this amendment is to protect the states’ right 
to maintain a militia, not any common law individual right to bear arms for 
self-defense. 
I daresay that, even under this second hypothetical, Scalia likely would 
interpret the original public meaning of the newly adopted amendment as 
being to codify the common law individual right to bear arms for self-
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defense.  I imagine that he would reject, as “dubious,” any recourse to the 
original public meaning as manifested in the debates concerning the 
purposes of adopting the language of the Amendment.  I would expect him 
to stand firm in his contention that the text was “to codify a pre-existing 
right, rather than to fashion a new one.”83 
My larger point with both of these hypotheticals is that Scalia’s approach 
to original public meaning blunts the transformative purpose of constitution 
making and amendment—as we have also seen in his approach to 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses.  It does so because of his prior jurisprudential presuppositions 
concerning (1) what counts as original public meaning, and (2) what the 
purpose of constitution making and amendment is.  Scalia’s approach to 
original public meaning historicizes rights.  Under his approach, 
constitution makers and amenders are not fashioning abstract commitments 
to rights whose meaning must be elaborated over time to determine our best 
understanding of them in the context of problems as they arise.  Instead, 
they are codifying preexisting rights whose content is known through their 
deposit in historical practices—the common law and statute books at the 
time of the ratification of the language. 
CONCLUSION 
I have suggested that the salutary inclusiveness of the new originalism—
in particular, its emphasis on the distinction between interpretation and 
construction—may give away more to the moral reading than the new 
originalists have recognized.  Accordingly, the prospects for reconciliation 
between the new originalism and the moral reading may be better than have 
been appreciated.  But I also have suggested that the movement from 
intention of the Framers to original public meaning may have an 
unacknowledged or at any rate underappreciated conservative bent.  I have 
issued a cautionary tale about how resort to original public meaning has 
entered into judicial decisionmaking by Justice Scalia, blunting the very 
possibility of constitutional transformation through amendment, and, 
indeed, of constitutional self-government through reflection and choice. 
 
 
 83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
